History
Theories of mental illness invoking isolation -whether social, personal or physical -have recently been resurrec ted after long neglect, and their renais sance has proceeded along many fronts (105) . It seems fair to say that the dis covery fifteen years ago that sensory deprivation could lead to psychotic be haviour might not have generated so much interest, were it not for the fact that the coincidence of isolation and madness has long been a source of fas cination in literature, religion and po pular thought. "It is not good," says Genesis, "that man should be alone." Such a notion turns up in every period of western thought in the last two thousand years. In a review of the sub ject in 1905, Small (131) marshalled a vast array of data to demonstrate the ubiquity of the notion that isolation op poses psychic well-being. He reviewed the biographies of one hundred famous historical and literary figures who had made a practice of isolating themselves, or who had been isolated for much of their lives; some of his observations are of interest. Cavendish "had a defect in speech ... he is said to have been the most silent man who ever lived outside a Trappist monastery ... he knew little of active life . . . his servants thought him demented." Heine "declared that the mental tortures of his solitude ex ceeded those of the Inquisition." Swedenborg -a mystical theologian -retired into complete silence in 1840; he never Canad. Psychiat. Ass. J. Vol. 12 (1967) debated his position and declared that he knew what he wrote to be the truth of God. He refused to join a literary society because he declared himself to be affiliated with the angels, of whom he had visions." Of one hundred persons reviewed by Small, eighteen had phy sical weakness, seventeen were of a 'pronounced neurotic type', nine had hallucinations, eight were famed for their visions, and sixteen suffered from a 'lack of will'. Interestingly enough, Small suggested that a person without visual stimulation would manifest "re trogression to a half-vegetative state, like that of infancy." In the light of recent experiments, that prediction stands as a prophecy of the first rank.
It has been well documented, for example by Hare (49, 50), that fashions in psychiatric thinking tend to arise not from psychiatric research or theory, but rather from beliefs and concerns in the general culture. In the present case, it was a widespread political and social apprehension about the defection of significant numbers of American troops to China during the Korean war which stimulated the first sensory deprivation experiments (11, 56, 57, 127) . The ques tion which preoccupied the investigators at that time was: what technique would give 'thought reform' its potency as a psychological weapon?
The hypotheti cal answer being tested out was: isola tion. Thus the surprising, and somewhat spectacular results of these early experi ments fell on a fertile social and intellec tual ground, and the revival of the iso lation hypothesis was assured.
Experiments
These pioneer experiments at McGill, beginning in 1951 under the direction of Hehb, demonstrated that when a per son is subjected to a reduction in sensory and perceptual input, a wide variety of behavioural changes takes place, includ ing an inability to concentrate, deficits in task performance, temporal and spa tial disorientation, depersonalization, hal lucinations and somatic delusions (11, 56, 57, 127) . Unfortunately, the explosion of interest which followed the publica tion of these findings tended to be mark ed more by enthusiasm than consistency, and subsequent experiments (81, 154, 155, 158) have seen wide divergencies both in experimental technique and in reported results, so that some doubts have arisen about the validity of the findings. With regard to methodology, it jsoon became apparent that the different experiments represented different com binations of a relatively great number of variables. Leaving aside contaminating variables -for example, suggestionthree general types of experimental sen sory restriction have been described (159): 1) a reduction of the absolute amount of stimulation (e.g. silence, darkness, joint immobilization) -a tech nique referred to as 'sensory deprivation in the strict sense'; 2) destructing of stimuli (e.g. ground glass goggles, mask ing noise) -referred to as 'perceptual isolation'; and 3) montonous repetition of stimuli -'sensory monotony'. This plethora of different techniques has raised a number of questions to which there are as yet few answers, although some systematic investigation of these variables has now begun (29, 155, 165, 166, 167, 169) . The discrepancies in the reported behavioural results have been equally great, with the result that we do not yet have a clear-cut phenomenological description of the sensory depriva tion syndrome under experimental con ditions. Thorpe (147) suggests that this confusion results directly from the fail ure so far to develop a rationale for the many different experimental techniques. At the same time, one can expect no more precision in the clinical observation of sensory deprivation phenomena than, for example, in the phenomenology of dreams, or in the behavioural sequels of 'hallucinogens such as LSD-25 (109) or than generally in clinical psychiatry, where the level of consistency and reli ability in clinical observation has been demonstrated under some circumstances to be astonishingly low (120) .
Here we have to leave aside the whole issue of conflicting methodologies and undefined variables, but it is well review ed elsewhere (147, 159) . We must, how ever, make explicit what has been a silent assumption underlying most of these researches, namely, that notwith standing all the variables involved, all these conditions grouped under the heading 'sensory deprivation', or 'sen sory restriction', or what we prefer to call informational underload, represent in the final analysis a common set of consequences for the functioning of the organism. Though we share this assump tion, it should be noted that at the present time there is no incontrovertible proof; one can only say that it appears to be a reasonable hypothesis, and there is at the moment no evidence that we should abandon it.
It should also be noted that even if our assumption is correct, one may still expect a great amount of variability in the clinical phenomenology of informa tional underload. It is, for example, a well-known fact that different brains will respond to similar events with dif ferent response patterns. (Manfred Bleuler (21) has noted that there are no specific psychopathological syndromes for specific lesions of the central nervous system, and Ferenczi (60) made the same point about general paresis. It is now generally known that it is unrea sonable to expect lobotomy to produce identical sequelae in different individuals, and the same is true of lysergic acid die thylamide (109) . The same point has in fact been made with reference to ex perimental sensory restriction itself (45, 56, 93, 95, 127, 132, 158) . Species-speci-fic and genetically determined character istics, previous life experience, and the stage of maturation and development of the organism are among the kinds of variables which may profoundly in fluence the way in which an assumed informational underload syndrome may express itself on the clinical level.
But beyond these complexities and methodological problems lies the ques tion of causation, with its implications for psychiatry in general. What hypo theses have so far been advanced by re searchers to account for the changed functioning observed in subjects under conditions of sensory restriction? Zuckerman and Cohen (169) list four levels of explanation: 1) The psychoanalytic theory of isola tion, as proposed by Goldberger (41), Goldfried (42), Kubie (75), Azima et al (5, 6) ; 2) The cognitive theory proposed by Bruner (19) and Freedman (37); 3) The social psychological theory, pro posed by Pollard and Jackson (64); 4) The neurophysiological theory (30, 43, 82, 98, 168, 169) . We will here be most concerned with this latter neurophysiological level of explanation.
The Model
People speak of a 'sensory deprivation model'; at this point we may delineate what it is. It consists of the findings of the various sensory restriction experi ments -including changes in perceptual, motor and cognitive function, suggesti bility, affective changes, hallucinations, changes in time perception, stimulus hunger, in addition to neurophysiologi cal, physiological and biochemical effects -together with the different theoretical explanations put forward to account for these phenomena. That is what we pre fer to call the informational underload model. It is relevant to ask, what has been the usefulness to psychiatry of this informational underload model in the understanding of clinical or non-clinical phenomena of interest to us? Or, has there been a consensus that certain clini cal or non-clinical conditions are best explained with reference to this model? Even a cursory glance at the literature reveals that the informational underload model has been both used and abused in this respect, with a wide variety of be havioural phenomena being character ised as analogous to sensory deprivation. A bibliography published in Prague a year-and-a-half ago (143) lists over 1,100 publications of this kind; detailed re views (59, 77, 136, 147, 159) have been published elsewhere. For our purposes, we should like to sketch briefly some of the relevant developments and specula tions.
Sensory underload and/or social iso lation appear to have importance in a large number of everyday living and working situations. For example, hallu cinations have been reported among long distance night truck drivers (56, 101) and high altitude jet pilots (121, 159) and accidents have been ascribed to sensory deprivation. Decrements in task performance and unusual visual ima gery have been reported in radar sen tinels and military sentinels stationed at isolated outposts (56, 86, 154, 159) . Arctic explorers, fugitives, solitary sailors and adventurers, shipwrecked persons, have all reported sensational subjective experiences which have been interpreted as sensory deprivation phenonomena (12, 62, 81, 95, 113, 130, 136, 148) . The notion that informational underload is an important ingredient in 'thought reform' rests on good evidence (80, 123, 142) . In many religions and cultures, rituals designed to evoke the 'mystical experience' -with hallucina tory phenomena -incorporate inter personal isolation, confinement and re striction of movement as a kind of selfimposed informational underload (131) .
The impact upon an organism of re striction of early experience has been a preoccupation of experimental psychol ogy since late in the 19th century (9), but long before that, reports of feral children (129) described strikingly aber rant behaviour on this basis. Experimen tal work with animals (38, 52, 79, 88-91, 102, 144-146, 157) has proceeded on the assumed importance of perceptual learn ing in infancy for the subsequent per formance of the organism in situations in which complex and integrated behav iours are required. Bruner (19) sum marizes these findings:
"In general an impoverished environment, one with diminished heterogeneity and a reduced, set of opportunities for manipula tion and discrimination, produces an adult organism with reduced abilities to discrim inate, with stunted strategies for coping with roundabout solutions, with less taste for ex ploratory behaviour, and with a notably re duced tendency to draw inferences that serve to cement the disparate events of its environment, such as between the light of a candle flame and the likelihood of its burn ing when you put your nose into it."
With regard to the impact of sensory restriction on human development, the largest body of work has concerned de ficient, unsatisfactory or unstabilized parental care under such headings as 'maternal deprivation', 'early emotional deprivation', 'anaclitic depression' (13, (139) (140) (141) . Bruner's comments noted above, apply equally well to these pheno mena.
More attention, however, has been paid to the possibility of applying the informational underload model to cer tain psychopathological syndromes man ifested by the mature human organism. Thus, sensory deprivation has served as an explanatory model for psychotic reactions occurring in persons living in alien language and cultural settings (1, 3, 36, 81) and for paranoid psychoses Which frequently develop in prisoners in solitary confinement (103, 136, 142, 163) . The transient psychotic reactions fre quently observed in medical and surgical situations in which the patient is immo bilized, isolated and subjected to definite limitations of sensory input, have come to be seen as better explained by sensory underload than by the previously pre ferred 'toxic' theories (64, 77, 92, 94) .
The frequency of hallucinatory and psy chotic states following cataract extrac tion, with bilateral eye patching, is wide ly noted (8, 27, 35, 44, 104, 163, 164) . A positive correlation between deafness and higher incidence of psychotic illness has been fairly well substantiated (4, 20, 53, 54, 63, 73, 77) . One of the ingredients of the hospitalization syndrome (22, 137, 161) is thought to be sensory restriction. Phantom limb hallucinations (108) have been characterized as 'sectional' sensory deprivation (36, 47) . Hallucinations in organic brain syndromes have been as cribed to infracortical deafferentation (36). More surprisingly, perhaps, infor mational underload has served as a model for certain types of therapy -in America, 'anaclitic therapy' (6, 7, 23, 39, 76, 118) and in Japan, 'morita ther apy' (72).
In summary, it becomes apparent that many investigators and practitioners have been struck by the similarities be tween, on the one hand the information al underload model as we have defined it, and on the other hand a wide variety of behavioural sequences noticed in dev eloping and mature organisms, human and non-human. Informational under load as an explanatory model has achieved a not inconsiderable measure of popularity in psychiatric thinking. This use of the model, however, has two rather severe limitations. In the first place, as we have noted, it is a possible but not proven assumption that the sev eral diverse experimental situations grouped under the heading 'sensory de privation' lead to a consistently occur ring neurophysiological syndrome. Se condly, this rather anecdotal, direct clinical use of the model rests to a large extent on analogy only, and perhaps in some cases on mere fancy (159) .
Furthermore, while it may be possible to apply this type of informational underload model to a number of clinical and non-clinical conditions of interest in psychiatry, this can hardly be maintain ed for the wide variety of clinical syn-dromes which we presently recognize. Does this therefore mean that we have exhausted the possible usefulness of the sensory underload model? It does not appear so to us. What we have witnessed in the last decade-and-a-half has been a 'scientization' of an old and time-hon oured notion -that isolation causes madness -and it may well be that this development has already passed its apogee of usefulness and popularity. Clearly, external sensory deprivation has a limited applicability to psychiatry. But recent neurophysiological inquiries appear to be leading in the direction of a more novel concept. If it is true that external sensory restriction -whether in the strict sense, or perceptual isola tion, or monotony -leads to a consis tently occurring set of neurophysiologi cal phenomena in the central core of the nervous system, the possibility then arises that such a neurophysiological, informational underload syndrome may be brought about by circumstances other than external sensory restriction itself. The supporting evidence for this possibility lies in the recent discovery of a sensory input regulating system in the central nervous system. Stanley Cobb (24) has said in this respect chat the last ten years have brought about a complete revision in our understanding of the central nervous system. One no longer thinks in terms of stimulus and response to an integrating central switch board mechanism. The reflexology of Sherrington and Pavlov has been sup planted by new concepts of reverbera ting circuits, feedback systems, informa tion theory, and evidence for the occur rence of central modulation of sensory perception. A new picture of the activity of the brain emerges: a picture of a prosencephalon alerted to receive select ed stimulation by mechanisms in the diencephalon and the mesencephalon, which in turn can influence peripheral sensory input. The picture becomes even more complex with the recognition of internuncial signalling systems opera ting among all levels, The physiology of sensory input, once thought to be so simple, now becomes incredibly com plex and mystifying. Here we shall have to be content with a sketchy outline.
There is good evidence that receptor cells are influenced by activity in the remote parts of the central nervous sys tem. Almost all afferent sensory chan nels appear to be accompanied by effer ent fibres passing from the central core to the receptor organs. For example, a bundle of efferent fibres travels with the eighth cranial nerve from the region of the superior olive to the contralateral cochlea, and it has been shown (55) that stimulation of the medulla in certain areas will cause suppression of auditory nerve responses to a standard stimulus. It has also been shown that firing of individual ganglion cells in the retina can be augmented or inhibited by stimu lation of certain parts of the mid-brain tegmentum, and that excitation of the anterior commissure, the prepyriform cortex, the cortical amygdaloid nucleus or the olfactory tubercle produces re duction in the activity of the olfactory bulb (83), Most, if not all, receptors appear to be under the feedback in fluence of the reticular core.
Hagbarth and Kerr (48) in 1954 found that artificial excitation of the brain stem reticular formation, or of cortical or cerebellar regions projecting on to it, significantly inhibited the trans mission of somatic afferent sensory com plexes across the first sensory relay in the spinal cord. These nuclei are con cerned with transmission of sensations of pain, temperature, and the postsynap tic fibres cross over into the spinal thal amic tracks to end in the ventrolateral nucleus of the thalamus. The same in vestigators noticed in 1955 (66) a similar inhibitory influence upon transmission in the olfactory bulb, while others found similar influences in Che posterior thala mic nuclei, the nucleus of the spinal tract of the fifth cranial nerve, and the dorsocochlear nucleus (124, 125) . It is thus clear that nonspecific influences from the reticular core of the brain stem and from cortical or cerebellar regions, or sensoiy afferent pathways projecting on to it, are able to exercise an inhibitory influence on the transmission of afferent sensory stimulation at a number of first sensory relays..
It has also been shown that reticular influences upon thalamic transmission (second sensory relay) in the somatic pathways leads to pronounced alterations in the characteristics of the stimulation (70). In addition, there are direct corti cal influences on these nuclear relays. Further, Magoun and his co-workers established beyond doubt the important influences of the reticular substance on the cortex itself (third relay). In turn, however, the cortex itself influences the reticular system, the thalamic relays, the spinal relays, and also probably the receptors themselves.
Such are the complexities of the sen sory input regulating system. It is as yet by no means fully understood, but even our present limited information about it suggests a rather pregnant question: do disequilibria in the sensory input regula ting system occur, resulting in either increased or decreased filtering of sen sory input? There is early evidence that a variety of pathogenetic processes (metabolic, toxic, degenerative, genetic, life-experiential, etc.,) may influence the sensory input regulating system in such a way that a state of internal sensory deprivation, or informational underload, ensues even in the presence of average external stimulus intensity. If this turns out to be the case, we will be faced with the task of determining the extent to which such an internal informational underload syndrome contributes to such important clinical conditions as schizo phrenia, deliria or organic psychoses. Investigating this possibility constitutes a rather formidable task, likely to oc cupy many researchers for many years -after which, of course, the answer may prove to be negative. An important first step will be to determine whether in fact there is a neurophysiologically definable informational underload syndrome; in Toronto, one of the authors (110) is working in this direction. Necessity will be the early recognition and evaluation of the many variables invol ved; a subsequent publication will at tempt to look at this area in detail. Here, we wish to bring together what evidence there is to support, 1) the existence of an internally caused, neurophysiologically definable informational underload syn drome, and, 2) its relevance to psychia tric phenomena.
Dreams, Sleep and Hallucinations
The first line of enquiry which sug gests itself is in the direction of hallucinoses in general -whether occurring in organic or functional psychoses, in experimental hallucinoses such as those produced by hallucinogens and by sleep deprivation, or in physiological condi tions such as dreaming. We may, of course, immediately engage ourselves in a debate regarding what we really mean by the term 'hallucination'. Two general types of definitions are possible: 1) an a priori definition which is axiomatic, precise and unchanging or, 2) an a pos teriori, empirical definition bereft of prior assumptions. In this regard, the comments of Kubie (74) are relevant: "I am no lover of definitions: to demand a definition at the beginning is like looking up the answer at the end of the arithmetic book before working out the problem. A defini tion which is imposed too early is a straitjacket on free and exploratory thought, a convenient way of excluding everything which might make the problem incon veniently complicated, thus artificially over simplifying it. Or if the premature definition is made all inclusive, it becomes useless. We win our right to make a definition only as we approach the goal of our investigations."
We would tend to agree with Riimke (122) who noted that we do not really know what 'to hallucinate' really means, and therefore we must be willing to accept the many and varied uses of the term in empirical research. We see no usefulness, then, in attempting to deter mine a priori whether the visual imagery reported in sensoiy deprivation experi ments should be called 'hallucinations' (57) or 'images' (40) or 'pseudohallucinations' (11) or 'hypnagogic hallucina tions' (149) . The fact is that a number of phenomena which we designate as hallucinatory are common to a large number of syndromes and physiological states, and we must first discover what similarities underlie these phenomena before we can either propose a defini tion or understand in what way these phenomena are different.
It is in this respect interesting to notice that investigators in search of a unitary theory of hallucinations have always been struck by the similarity of the dreams of sanity and the hallucinations of madness. Hughlings Jackson (133) traced this observation back to Plato and Aristotle, and described dreams as 'physiologic insanity'. He stressed the importance of the nature of the dissolu tion of cerebral function as the major factor underlying hallucinations. Wil liam James was particularly interested in the informational characteristics of sti muli reaching the organism from the external environment and their relation to the mechanisms of hallucinations; he suggested (65) that hallucinations pro bably are brought about by excitement from within those brain centres which are active in normal perception, and that hallucinations might be viewed as the response of a normally functioning ner vous system to ambiguous stimuli. His 'law of figured consciousness' has been substantiated by later evidence that the brain fills in the gaps in incomplete or ambiguous sensory messages. Schilder (i26) noted that a hallucination brings to the foreground those aspects of ima gination and perception which in the normal person remain in the background. Our question is: does increased filtering at the input level of the central nervous system cause 'cerebral dissolution' (Jack son) or stimulus ambiguity (James) or foreground-background confusion (Schilder)?
Evarts (31) notes that 2,500 years of philosophic, neuropsychologic and neurophysiologic investigation into hallu cinations has yielded three areas of agreement:
1) That dreams and hallucinations are similar in nature; 2) That both of these phenomena are correlative with activity of those brain centres involved in waking perception; 3) That hallucinations, dreams and waking perceptions are correlative with a 'strong discharge' of the same nervous arrangements whose 'weak discharge' is correlative with the corresponding thought, idea or memory.
He notes that these propositions, if true, yield an interesting and testable hypothesis: that some hallucinations are correlative with a neurophysiological process similar to one which occurs in sleep, and which consists of abnormally brisk discharge of centres involved in waking perception. Thus it is of interest that the neurophysiological picture of REM sleep which now emerges (134) includes some centrally modulated inhi bition of incoming sensoiy information associated with increased thalamic excit ability. Moreover, the organism deprived of this dreaming state for a few days begins to show psychotic symptomatol ogy. Clearly, the sensory input regula ting system plays a crucial part in dream ing and hallucination (51). Scheibel and Scheibel (124) have noted that external sensory restriction and sleep are two situations in which there is reduced in put to the reticular core; they suggest that the gradual development of report ed visual sensations in external sensoiy deprivation experiments may represent simply a normal expression of the phy siological function of brain cells whose modulation by specific sensory and nonspecific reticular input drops below a critical level, with consequent changes in cell biasing and concomitantly in creased 'sensitivity' to what is usually 'background activity' in intracerebral loops. They suggest that the role of the brain stem reticular core warrants serious examination, for in their words "it is the only system that can be demonstrated to be involved anatomically and physiolo gically at each or all levels." Their hypo thesis, supported by good evidence, that what they call "non-object-bound sen sory phenomena" (i.e. dreams and hallu cinations) arise either, 1) because of qualitative or quantitative distortions of sensory input or, 2) distortions of cen tral analyser functions which either mis interpret external signals or give more weight to internal signals, comes very close to what we have called internal informational underload.
To say it briefly: in the core of the central nervous system there is a sensory input regulating mechanism whose func tion becomes altered, 1) in rapid eyemovement sleep, 2) as a result of dream deprivation, 3) as a result of external sensory restriction -the effect being a functional reduction of informational in put to the brain, to which other areas of the brain respond in a compensatory way, resulting in a hallucinatory experience.
We may now ask, what other factors may so alter this input regulating system in such a way that effective informa tional input is reduced?
Psychotropic Drugs
Several writers have noted the simi larity of the sensory deprivation syn drome and the syndrome produced by LSD (10, 33, 57, 116) , phencyclidine* (85, 96), psilocybin (33) and mescaline (33, 57). Each of these, of course, has been treated as a model psychosis in the hope that some light might be thrown on the pathogenesis of naturally occur ring psychotic phenomena. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review ex haustively the vast array of neuropharmacological and neurophysiological data which has accumulated from studies on
LSD-25 and the other psychotomimetic drugs. We shall have to limit ourselves to a brief discussion of the available evidence, which is considerable, point ing to the sensory input system as a like ly site of action for these drugs.
Evarts et al (33) found that LSD exerts in the cat a relative block of ganglionic transmission at the lateral geniculate stage in the visual pathway; on observation such animals appear blind. From this and other observations Evarts (unpublished) once suggested that LSD exhibits the special capacity to block sensory synapses as a sort of curare of the sensory system. Bradley's early neurophysiological studies of the action of LSD (15, 16) led him to the con clusion that the drug's effects were closely related to the influence of affer ent impulses entering the reticular for mation through collaterals from sensory pathways, and not, apparently, due to a direct effect on the reticular core itself. His more recent studies (14) led him to conclude "that the drug has a site of action closely related to the neurophysiologic mechanisms concerned with the filtering and integration of sensory in formation"; he discovered a differential effect of LSD on conditioned and nonconditioned arousal responses which he interprets to be the result of LSD's capacity for impairing the ability of an organism to discriminate between dif ferent stimuli. Marrazzi (87) cites firm evidence that LSD-25along with other exogenous psychotogens and sero tonin -is a powerful cerebral synaptic inhibitor; for example, it markedly sup presses transcallosally evoked potentials. On the other hand, the same drug may in some circumstances (32, 111) facili tate radiation-evoked potentials; he points out, however, that this facilitatory effect may be the end result of inhibition of an inhibitory feedback circuit. The issue is enormously complicated by the recent recognition of several different types of synapse, some of which are ex citatory and some of which are inhibi-toiy. One possibility of course is that these two neurophysiological effects may be chemically induced equivalents of overload and underload of sensory input -both of which, as we shall discuss later, may result in a final condition of internal sensory underload. A general theory of hallucination proposed by Marrazzi (87) is not at variance with this concept, and appears to have rele vance for a broader understanding of psychotic phenomena generally:
". . . when the threshold for an effect on an association area is lower than that for a prim ary receiving area in any sensory modality (as is the case for inhibition in the visual pathways), there results a dissociation of the two information-handling areas. Dissociation between a primary receiving area and an association area, where past experience is stored, would result in failure of adequate reality checking."
A newer, and in the view of some investigators (115), a more promising psychotomimetic compound is phency clidine; it was introduced as an anaes thetic agent, producing a profound anal gesia without loss of consciousness. It has been classed as a sensory blocking agent (28), and several investigators have noted the resemblance of its effects to chose of experimental sensory depriva tion (85, 96, 115) . In fact, its usefulness as an anaesthetic agent is severely limited by its psychiatric sequelae. But as Davies points out (28), the very effects which are bothersome to the anaesthetist are of great interest to the psychiatrist; they include depersonalization, disordered thought, disturbances of affect including hostility and withdrawal, and in some cases an acute confusional psychosis (85, 96) . Meyer et al (96) noted that the drug tended to produce its most severe effects in persons who were blind, and in persons suffering from postencephali tic parkinsonism -a finding in keeping with a sensory blocking mode of action. Luby (85) likened the effects of phen cyclidine to the primary symptoms of schizophrenia, in contrast to the effects of LSD which in his view are more like the secondary symptoms of that syn drome. Rosenbaum et al (25, 84, 117) compared the effects of LSD, amobarbital, amphetamine and phencyclidine on schizophrenics' and normals' perfor mance in tests of reaction time, rotary pursuit, and weight discrimination; he found that the administration of phen cyclidine to normals produced test re sults which were virtually identical to the test results of schizophrenics who had not had the drug. Luby (26) found that external sensory deprivation tended to damp the drug effects; Cohen (84) , working in the opposite direction, found that phencyclidine tended to worsen the symptomatology of sensory deprivation subjects. Davies (28) in reviewing some of this work, notes the developing con sensus that phencyclidine acts on the ascending reticular activating system, and suggests, in the light of Bradley's work with LSD, that similar neurophy siological studies with phencyclidine "would be of great interest." But while all this is highly suggestive, and begins to look very promising in terms of a general theory of hallucinations, the issues involved are.far from settled. Evarts (32) in a more general review of the neurophysiological work with psychotomimetic drugs, has pointed out that we do not yet have enough infor mation to allow an evaluation of the re lationship between electrophysiological effects and psychological effects of psy chotomimetic agents. The difficulty, he says, of establishing a causal relationship between electrophysiological and psy chological events is one of the factors which has discouraged many physiolo gists from undertaking studies of the action of these drugs. It is not possible, for example, to say that the effect of LSD on synaptic systems within the cor tex is causally related to the psychologi cal effects of the drug. The transcallosal transmission may be interrupted per manently without any gross psychologi cal effects; Akelaitis (2) has carried put a number of complete sections of the corpus callosum and the anterior com missure in man without apparent psy chological effects. The mere interrup tion of callosal transmission, then, does not explain effects of LSD on percep tion; neither can the drug's effects on intrahemispheric cortical pathways be held responsible; Sperry (138) has been able to demonstrate that multiple subpial cross-cutting of the striate cortex in the cat produces no discernible effects.
A second approach to the question of the relationship between electrophysiol ogical and psychological events might take the form of attempting to predict a drug's psychological effects in man on the basis of its effects on the electrical activity in the brains of animals. But, as Evarts points out, this is not yet possible either. If, for example, inhibition of the transcallosal response were to be taken as a predictive index, then we would expect amphetamine, curare, serotonin, and bufotenin, all of which suppress the transcallosal response (111) , to be psy chotomimetic agents; the fact is that only two of these drugs turn out to be so. The fact that LSD brings about an arousal response in the EEG is equally useless in this respect, since many agents which are not psychotomimetic have similar effects. Reserpine, which is anti psychotic, causes desynchronization of spontaneous electrical activity (112) , while N-allyl normorphine, a psychoto mimetic, causes the appearance of a sleep pattern in the EEG (160) . The effects of drugs on lateral geniculate synaptic transmission are also of very limited value in predicting psychological effects; bufotenin is approximately one-tenth as active as LSD in inhibiting geniculate transmission, and on the basis of this ratio should have psychotomimetic ef fects in doses of the order of 1 mg.; in fact, 10 to 16 mg. is needed (32, 106).
Finally, one might start, not from the demonstrated pnysiological effects of LSD, but with an attempt to predict a priori the electrophysiological effects that hallucinogenic drugs should have, on the basis of other theory and data. Evarts sees many difficulties in this ap proach also; visual hallucinations have been attributed to lesions at every ima ginable point along the ascending visual pathway, from the eye itself to the cor tex, and in many cases to lesions that do not appear to impinge on the visual pathway at all. Thus Evarts suggests it would be difficult to single out any one area that needs to be disturbed in order to bring about hallucination. But nownine years after Evarts made these re marks -it appears to us chat there is ample evidence to support the hypothesis that disturbances in the sensory regula ting mechanism are crucial to the devel opment of hallucinations, and that such disturbances may well take the form of an internal informational underload as we have proposed.
At this point we must make brief mention of the question of the mode of action of antipsychotic drugs. It is a curious fact that there should be less agreement and less proven fact regarding the mode of action of these drugs than there is regarding the mode of action of some psychotomimetics. Nevertheless, many investigators are coming to agree in at least one respect -that the phenothiazines exert some action on the brain reticular core. The problem of deter mining the nature of this effect however is something else again. Himwich (58) discovered that chlorpromazine prevents the cortical arousal response-to pain, with the result that the pain itself re mains in awareness but its distressing emotional component is mitigated. Thus the suggestion arises that chlorpromazine depresses the activity of the subcortical activating system (61, 68, 97, 151) and/ or its connections to the Papez circuit (107) . Others have postulated a more direct action on the limbic system. Killam et al wrote that "the mechanism of action of tranquillizing agents cannot, be considered to be the selective depression of the reticular activating system" (69). They suggested that its action might April 1967
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occur anteriorly in some arousal systems in which the diffuse thalamic projection is a major link; they also have suggested that it might influence outflow of cir cuits from the limbic system. It must also be noted that if a func tional disturbance of the sensory input regulating system -for example, what we have called informational underload -is in fact a final common pathway of psychotic experience, one could then account for the effects of antipsychotic compounds in either or both of two ways: 1) by their action on the reticular core, or 2) by their effect on some prior factor such as anxiety, perhaps by in fluencing the limbic system. Thus evi dence which points to the visceral brain as the crucial site of action of antipsy chotic drugs does not diminish the im portance of the reticular core, since there is a highly sensitive feedback ar rangement between these two systems.
Organic Syndromes
In one of the early reports on experi mental sensory restriction, Heron (57) likened the effects of isolation to some organic syndromes. It must be reiterated that a mere similarity of two or more syndromes does not in itself support the postulate of a common aetiology. There is, however, some early evidence that there are some commonalities between the pathogenetic factors underlying or ganic syndromes, and internally caused informational underload.
Cameron's study of senile nocturnal delirium (20) demonstrated that simply placing a senile patient in a darkened room for one hour was sufficient to produce a full-blown delirium; that is, these patients had a clear-cut suscepti bility to reduction or depatterning of stimuli. Ziskind (163) notes that sensory deprivation -even, one supposes, of a mild degree -may operate as a stress significant enough to produce a psycho tic episode in elderly patients. Two questions are relevant: 1) is the senile patient's susceptibility to external sen soiy deprivation due to an already exist ing subclinical state of sensory under load, and if that is the case, 2) is the sensory underload predominantly ex ternal to the brain on the basis of deafferentation, or is it internal, or might it be both?
Frederiks (36) has suggested that the hallucinations of organic syndromes oc cur as a result of diminished stimulus structure and intensity caused by infracortical deafferentation -that is, infor mational underload external to the brain. Letemendia's finding that the brain in Alzheimer's disease responds less to sen sory stimulation (78) would be in keep ing with this notion. MacLean (99) sug gested ten years ago that there might be an underlying pathological similarity between encephalitis lethargica -which does involve the reticular core -and particularly the behavioural aspects of epilepsies due to lesions of the frontotemporal limbic cortex. Evarts (109) and the Scheibels (124) have been able to show chat activity from the temporal lobe is capable of modulating or 'bias ing' the excitability of the visual cortex, apparently via the brain stem.
Goldstein's contributions to the un derstanding of organic syndromes are in keeping with this line of thought. One can speak, for example, of the 'shrunken environment' of the patient with an organic syndrome. Goldstein notes that there is a rise in the threshold of excite ment, with the result that stronger or more prolonged stimulation is necessary to elicit a response. The organic patient, says Goldstein, cannot distinguish be tween figure and background, with the result that he is always confronted with ambiguous stimuli.
It seems fair to say, then, that both internal and external informational un derload are of some importance in sev eral organic syndromes.
Schizophrenia
The most crucial area of evidence for the clinical importance of informational underload comes under this heading. Or to put it in logical terms, the most im portant extension of the informational underload model is in the direction of schizophrenia. There are in the litera ture innumerable references to the simi larities between the symptoms of sen sory deprivation and those of schizo phrenia. Rosenzweig (119) sums it up: "One cannot help noting that throughout these reports . . . there appear again and again Bleuler's cardinal symptoms of schizo phrenia -a disturbance of associations, dysharmony of affect, autism, ambivalence. We see disruption of secondary thought pro cesses, regression to the primary process, im pairment of reality testing, and in addition such accessory symptoms as distortion of body image, depersonalization, delusions, hallucinations." Analogies between the operative fac tors in experimental sensory deprivation and presumed setiologic factors in schi zophrenia have been developed by many writers (36, 46, 81, 123, 128, 162, 163, 165) which Azima and Kramer (5) have reduced to essentially similar statements in three universes of discourse: 1) Psychoanalytic hypothesis: isolation leads to a frustration of libidinal drives and narcissistic injuries; aggression is repress ed or introverted, leading to a 'split in the ego', or depersonalization and a psy chotic experience.
2) Relationship hypothesis: the integrity of the body scheme, as a perceptual pheno menon, depends upon a close perceptual and expressional relationship with external objects; isolation leads to a disruption of this relationship, allowing a return to earlier and less well-organized relationship levels.
3) Physiological hypothesis: reduction of intensity and variability of sensory input leads to an inhibition of the ascending reticular formation, resulting in the re lease of auto-repetitive 'neuronal sets', providing the experience of depersonaliza tion and hallucination.
It should be observed that much of this sort of theorizing has been applied to external sensory deprivation for ex planation; in effect, a psychiatric theory about schizophrenia serves as a model for a theory about sensory deprivation.
But a line of reasoning in the opposite direction is equally tenable, and we think more fruitful. Traditional psychodynamic theory has it that an important setiological component in schizophrenia is the establishment early in life of a tendency towards interpersonal with drawal in a context of pathological child-parent relationships, with what are called in the poetical language of metapsychology 'poor object relationships'. Schizoid persons, as we understand them, tend to prefer fantasy (internal sources of information) to external real ity (external sources of information). That is, a life-long policy of inattention to external reality predisposes to schizo phrenia, and in fact is a prominent fea ture of the chronic syndrome. Accept ing this kind of formulation for the moment, the question is: is internal in formational underload the neurophy siological equivalent of autism?
Rosenzweig's (119) ideas about the origin of schizophrenia are relevant here. In his view, normal mental activity is dependent upon the appropriate inter action of two functional systems: the primitive affect system, functionally re miniscent of Freud's primary process (neurophysiologically the limbic system [18] ), and the abstract system, analogous to Freud's secondary process (neuro physiologically the neocortex [18] ); the latter system correlates stimuli from the various sensory modalities, and tests reality, while the limbic, primitive af fect system is more concerned with in ternal cues and with internal homeos tasis, Schizophrenia, in this frame of re ference, becomes an internal derange ment interfering with the communica tion between these two systems, and sensory deprivation comes to be seen as an externally induced but similar der angement.
In support of this line of thinking is West's proposal (156) that effective sensory input -input available through the ascending reticular system -may be impaired in any one of three ways: This view promises to lend some co herence to several apparently disparate research-derived setiological models of schizophrenia. Some workers character ize schizophrenia as a disorder of atten tion, resulting from the disturbing effect of sensory overload on the sensory in put regulating system; Fish (34) speaks of a detachment of reverberating reticu lar activity in the chronic syndrome. Kleist (21, 71) divided his great cluster of finely distinguished schizophrenic syndromes into 'cortical' and 'brain stem' type, although not on the basis of neurophysiological work. Snyder et al (135) interpret their finding of a per ceptual closure deficit in schizophrenic subjects to be compatible with theories of schizophrenia which point to a deficit of energizing or arousal systems in the brain, including the reticular and limbic systems, although they find another theory dealing with 'mental sets', equal ly compatible. One may simply be a re-statement of the other. Some of the biochemical substances which have for brief periods enjoyed popularity as 'causes' of schizophrenia have been thought to act on the brain via the reti cular core. McGhie and Chapman (100), studying distractability in schizophren ics, have found support for their belief that disturbances in the reticular activa ting system may be the main pathogene tic factor in the disease. The studies of Venables et al (152, 153) are in this direction also.
It is well known that the psychotic syndrome elicited by withdrawal from amphetamine is indistinguishable from what we call paranoid schizophrenia. In this connection it is interesting to note that an overdose of amphetamine pro duces an arousal response in the cortex which stimulates the effects of direct stimulation of the ascending reticular activating system. Thus, Eysenck's characterization of amphetamine as an introversive drug is of interest; like other stimulants, it promotes, via the ascending reticular activating system, strong excitation and an excessively weak reactive cortical inhibition, yield ing a state which we call introversion. Eysenck points out chat amphetamine, like other hallucinogens, inhibits synap tic transmission, and comments "it is not surprising that prolonged and excessive administration of it may lead to a schizo phrenic-like state" (150) .
Much of the biochemical research in schizophrenia has been under rather severe criticism (67), on the grounds of both theory and methodology. One gen eral comment is relevant here: a search for a biochemical cause for schizophren ia implies that neurophysiological pheno mena are ultimately the results of bio chemical events. Such an assumption is open to question. Roberts (114) in pro posing that schizophrenia is essentially a disorder of the central Papezian path way, makes this comment: is more amenable to electrophysiological than biochemical answers. Indeed some answers are already forthcoming, as we have attempted to indicate. It is clear that the reticular core has the capacity to shut down input to the brain from any sensory modality, and that it is continually tuning in or tuning out in coming information from all receptor areas. West (156) proposes that a nor mal flow of input gaining access to the brain through this gating mechanism has the effect of inhibiting the release into awareness of percepts and memory traces from within the brain; the corol lary of this is that a shutdown -induced ^internally, or imposed externally -re leases these same percepts and memoiy traces in unfamiliar or new combina tions, allowing a psychotic experience. If West is correct in his belief that such a shutdown can be brought about by external underload or overload, or by the use of dissociative mechanisms, then we appear to have arrived at a neuro physiological statement of Bellak's no tion (10) of a final common pathway of psychotic experience -internal infor mational underload -produced either by psychological experience resembling that of narcissistic withdrawal, or by toxic substances, or perhaps by a host of other pathogenetic factors.
Summary
To summarize briefly: Converging data from many disciplines -psychol ogy, psychiatry, social theory, biochem istry, neuropharmacology, neurophy siology -point to the sensory input regulating mechanism of the central nervous system as a critical factor in the production of hallucinoses and psy chotic experience. There is good evi dence that what we have called the in formational underload model holds considerable promise for improving our understanding of many clinical and non clinical phenomena of interest to psy chiatry. The evidence suggests that a neurophysiological, internal informa tional underload syndrome may be a final common pathway of psychotic experience. The question as to where such a syndrome might occur in the brain, together with the question of whether such an informational under load syndrome might be due to toxins, genetic factors, conditioning processes, anxiety or dissociation, or other causes, has to be left open. What is needed now, is research directed at these two questions: 1) does such an internal in formational underload syndrome occur in the brain, 2) when, where, and under what circumstances does it occur? 
